This is relatively minor point, but I encountered an interesting distinction in class the other day with the French subjunctive. A verb mood (not tense) that is rarely discussed in the English language, it is used to "express a wish, emotion, possibility, judgment, opinion, necessity, or action that has not yet occurred." (Thanks, Wikipedia.) Take the following sentence, for example:
The best director that I know is Martin Scorsese.
Le meilleur réalisateur que je sache est Martin Scorsese.
Here, the verb "sache" is in the subjunctive mood of "savoir," or "to know." This is because I am expressing a judgment about Martin Scorsese as the best director I know. However, the same sentence can also be translated with the indicative mood, and the resulting meaning is quite different:
The best director that I know is Martin Scorsese.
Le meilleur réalisateur que je sais est Martin Scorsese.
In this version, the verb "sais" is in the indicative mood. What does this mean, then? By choosing to not use the subjunctive here, the sentence takes on a much more presumptuous tone. Rather than expressing an opinion or judgment about the best director one knows, it is asserting an objective truth on the topic. This sentence, then, may very well be followed by an argument as to why Martin Scorsese is such a wonderful director.
The larger point here is the amazing subtelty of language, that one can express this kind of intellectual arrogance with simply a different verb in one language, but not in another. If one takes language to be a means of expression of a people--an expression of Hegel's zeitgeist--it becomes a very fascinating study.
Tuesday, April 13, 2010
On A Personal Note...
Wednesday, April 7, 2010
Playground Tactics and Feminism
Reading MacKinnon's Feminism Unmodified (besides garnering perplexed glances from across the library table) has been enlightening and frustrating in many ways. For starters, MacKinnon's distinction between feminist analysis of male and female as fundamentally different or the same is an important one. Whereas arguing from the principle of sameness almost necessarily implies existing behind a veil of ignorance where gender is not considered, arguing from the principle of difference requires constant modification of rules, laws, traditions, etc. to "equalize" the differences. Therein lies the fundamental misunderstanding of feminism, I think. That feminists have argued from both sides makes it very confusing as to what exactly a feminist wants. The answer is equality, but how this is brought about is rather tricky.
I'd like to draw attention to feminist philosophy at a meta level, and pose the question:
Does the existence of feminist literature and philosophy promote and further this cause of "sex equality," (which MacKinnon points out is in ways an oxymoron) or does it actually hinder its own progress?
MacKinnon's philosophy is very straight-forward, and though neither apologetic nor accusatory, outlines this gender disparity in a very objective manner. In so doing, however, is she undermining her own goal? In many ways, the legal system is equal when it comes to gender, or at least has the intention of being equal. Of course, there are many problems, especially when the sameness-as-basis and difference-as-basis ideologies collide. Most of the problems that even MacKinnon raises are grounded in historical inequality and circumstances that cannot be changed. The fact that quilt-making is not true art the way a Picasso painting is--or that it is not acknowledged as such--is something that is embedded in our social consciousness based on the way we have been conditioned into believing what constitutes art. Is this more subtle form (though still powerful) of gender inequality to be fought with direct philosophy?
Part of what dealing with this question brings to mind is the playground tactic of "playing it cool," and addresses many regular conflicts we have between feigning ambivalence and confrontation. Perhaps this suggestion even seems sexist in itself in "silencing" the voices of the feminists, but that is far from my intention. We all want power, but power is also directly correlated with responsibility. As the client of this dominatrix [credit to Paige Simmons and Facebook for making this information available to me] would tell you, the pressures on "successful" men of being in positions of power are not always so pleasant. My objection is simply the fact that some of the evocative language used in MacKinnon strikes me as distancing women from men. What is truly the best method in which to pursue this gender equality?
I'd like to draw attention to feminist philosophy at a meta level, and pose the question:
Does the existence of feminist literature and philosophy promote and further this cause of "sex equality," (which MacKinnon points out is in ways an oxymoron) or does it actually hinder its own progress?
MacKinnon's philosophy is very straight-forward, and though neither apologetic nor accusatory, outlines this gender disparity in a very objective manner. In so doing, however, is she undermining her own goal? In many ways, the legal system is equal when it comes to gender, or at least has the intention of being equal. Of course, there are many problems, especially when the sameness-as-basis and difference-as-basis ideologies collide. Most of the problems that even MacKinnon raises are grounded in historical inequality and circumstances that cannot be changed. The fact that quilt-making is not true art the way a Picasso painting is--or that it is not acknowledged as such--is something that is embedded in our social consciousness based on the way we have been conditioned into believing what constitutes art. Is this more subtle form (though still powerful) of gender inequality to be fought with direct philosophy?
Part of what dealing with this question brings to mind is the playground tactic of "playing it cool," and addresses many regular conflicts we have between feigning ambivalence and confrontation. Perhaps this suggestion even seems sexist in itself in "silencing" the voices of the feminists, but that is far from my intention. We all want power, but power is also directly correlated with responsibility. As the client of this dominatrix [credit to Paige Simmons and Facebook for making this information available to me] would tell you, the pressures on "successful" men of being in positions of power are not always so pleasant. My objection is simply the fact that some of the evocative language used in MacKinnon strikes me as distancing women from men. What is truly the best method in which to pursue this gender equality?
Monday, April 5, 2010
Greeks and National Affiliation
First, I must begin by declaring my affiliation with the Delta Gamma Chapter of Sigma Nu Fraternity. Like any organization, it's had its ups and downs, but I can honestly say that I feel very lucky to be associated with so many wonderful brothers.
I, however, cannot say that I can honestly support the national affiliation of my fraternity and fraternities in general. The hierarchical and infrastructural system created in 1869 is beyond outdated and does not reflect the purposes and needs of the modern fraternity. Sigma Nu is founded on the tenets of love, honor, and truth:
Poor capitalization and punctuation aside, this creed is both decidedly vague and utterly unmentioned in the rushing process. Chapters do not emphasize it, nor should they. At the same time, I have heard it both used and misused, and it is no more than an equivocal statement with which one cannot honestly disagree. The endless paperwork and "support network" requested and provided by the national headquarters add little to nothing to the experience of being a brother, and this rhetoric merely represents the unthinking hierarchy that the old-school fraternities still aim to maintain. It's not difficult to come up with theodicies explaining away the national affilitaion, but that does not justify these ties.
Fraternities as they have become redefined are no longer centers of ideology. Most liberal college campuses have moved far beyond that, and other institutions have become leading centers for ideology. Additionally, with a diversification of such intellectual ideas and ideologies, it's impossible to capture one singular idea within the context of a far-reaching national fraternity. As numbers increase, the ideology necessarily becomes vague and diluted.
Another important problem is that the values often embodied take on a "slave" valuation of morality, as characterized by Nietzsche. The following quote comes from his first essay in the Geneology of Morals. Just like the values of the Christian institution cited here, these values of "love, honor, and truth" are no more than slave valuations of morality.
Of course, practically speaking, the system requires a national affiliation. Even newly founded fraternities will find themselves to be proselytizing and spreading chapters to other colleges, but perhaps we ought to think as a community as to why we are involved in Greek life in the first place. Is it the values and ideologies, or the friends and people? What was it in its conception and what is it now? Should we stay true to the "intentions" of our ancestors or have we transcended the molds they've created for us?
I, however, cannot say that I can honestly support the national affiliation of my fraternity and fraternities in general. The hierarchical and infrastructural system created in 1869 is beyond outdated and does not reflect the purposes and needs of the modern fraternity. Sigma Nu is founded on the tenets of love, honor, and truth:
To Believe in the Life of Love,
To Walk in the Way of Honor,
To Serve in the Light of Truth,
This is the Life, the Way, and the Light of Sigma Nu --
This is the Creed of our Fraternity.
Poor capitalization and punctuation aside, this creed is both decidedly vague and utterly unmentioned in the rushing process. Chapters do not emphasize it, nor should they. At the same time, I have heard it both used and misused, and it is no more than an equivocal statement with which one cannot honestly disagree. The endless paperwork and "support network" requested and provided by the national headquarters add little to nothing to the experience of being a brother, and this rhetoric merely represents the unthinking hierarchy that the old-school fraternities still aim to maintain. It's not difficult to come up with theodicies explaining away the national affilitaion, but that does not justify these ties.
Fraternities as they have become redefined are no longer centers of ideology. Most liberal college campuses have moved far beyond that, and other institutions have become leading centers for ideology. Additionally, with a diversification of such intellectual ideas and ideologies, it's impossible to capture one singular idea within the context of a far-reaching national fraternity. As numbers increase, the ideology necessarily becomes vague and diluted.
Another important problem is that the values often embodied take on a "slave" valuation of morality, as characterized by Nietzsche. The following quote comes from his first essay in the Geneology of Morals. Just like the values of the Christian institution cited here, these values of "love, honor, and truth" are no more than slave valuations of morality.
--And what do they call that which serves to console them for all the suffering of life--their phantasmagoria of anticipated future bliss?What, then, can a national affiliation provide a fraternity? Fraternities have a positive associational aspect to them which is highly valuable, and provide a certain flexibility in action as well as a communal residential opportunity not available elsewhere. They are perhaps as close as one can find of a Marxist species-life on a modern American college campus, with collective material projects taken on, and--with the exception of their national affiliations--free from the constraints of a singular, forward-moving agenda.
--"What? Do I hear aright? They call that "the Last Judgment,' the coming of their kingdom, of the 'Kingdom of God'--meanwhile, however, they live 'in faith,' 'in love,' 'in hope.'"
--Enough! Enough!
Of course, practically speaking, the system requires a national affiliation. Even newly founded fraternities will find themselves to be proselytizing and spreading chapters to other colleges, but perhaps we ought to think as a community as to why we are involved in Greek life in the first place. Is it the values and ideologies, or the friends and people? What was it in its conception and what is it now? Should we stay true to the "intentions" of our ancestors or have we transcended the molds they've created for us?
Tuesday, March 23, 2010
Love and Rationality
Harry Frankfurt, Princeton Professor of Philosophy and author of The Reason for Love (more popularly, On Bullshit) says that it isn't that we have reasons for loving. Rather, it is simply that love gives us reasons. Cited as an analogy to the capitulation necessary for religious faith, this idea was brought forward by my "Philosophy of Religion" TA in discussion today. As pointed out also by John Cottingham in The Spiritual Dimension, Blaise Pascal--the famous 17th century mathematician and Catholic convert--also says, "La coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point." Or, in English, "The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know at all." Love amongst humans seems to be a very fitting metaphor for religion in this case because both require an openness and capitulation of the self into intellectually murky territory.
Before I begin, it's probably important to note what I mean by "love." Although I'm mostly talking about romantic love (for the sake of simplicity), I mean to include any sort of inexplicable love. True frienship, for example, would be included in this conception of "love" because we have some feeling of affinity for which we cannot completely explain. "Friends" who exist solely for some conscious purpose (e.g. helping with homework) obviously are excluded.
Independent of the religious arguments these claims about love and rationality were cited for, this idea of a primacy of love over rationality is an interesting one.* The argument made for the primacy of love is a compelling and heartfelt human one. The fact that love has been studied extensively in the disciplines of philosophy, sociology, psychology, neuroscience, etc. without any comprehensive or unifying theory can be seen as evidence that love somehow defies rational understanding. Even evolutionary biologists, who may argue that love is merely a set of chemical reactions in the brain that were bred into us as an evolutionary tool for survival of the species, can not possibly claim to understand the entirety of the emotion. After all, breaking it down into hormonal components--while potentially revealing about certain aspects of love or human nature--can never really encapsulate the entirety of the phenomenon.
Nevertheless, despite how resistant to rationality love may be, the body of work conducted around the phenomenon of love also shows how interested we are in coming to some sort of rational understanding of it. This impulse to provide an explantion grounded in reason of a fundamentally unreasonable feeling (or fundamentally complex feeling such that reason alone is insufficient in comprehending it) seems to be quite natural. While rationality may not be able to provide a definitive and fully comprehensive reason for love, it can certainly help us to better understand it and perhaps have a better awareness of our own love.
Can love, then, really transcend rationality, or have some sort of primacy over it? Or does rationality legitimately have a place in understanding and analyzing the phenomenon of love? Not to be cliché, but it seems like the answer is properly a combination of both. In a way, we can say that love transcends our rationality in that we can never understand our feelings of love when internal to the system, i.e. when we are loving. To put it another way, we don't (rationally, at least) choose who or what we love. But to say that love is completely independent of rationality would also be absurd, although this rationality can likely only serve as an agent of reflection, and no more. Rationality dictating love seems to entirely defeat the purpose and circumvent the definition of love. However, this claim doesn't seem to invalidate the intellectual effort spent on understanding, as Queen would call it, this "crazy little thing called love."
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*Cottingham argues for the primacy of praxis, or religious practice as a way of having religious faith without sacrificing rationality. That argument doesn't seem to really apply in the same way to love. We are then, therefore, left with the the primacy of either love or rationality, and unlikely both. [See Ch.1 of The Spiritual Dimension.]
Before I begin, it's probably important to note what I mean by "love." Although I'm mostly talking about romantic love (for the sake of simplicity), I mean to include any sort of inexplicable love. True frienship, for example, would be included in this conception of "love" because we have some feeling of affinity for which we cannot completely explain. "Friends" who exist solely for some conscious purpose (e.g. helping with homework) obviously are excluded.
Independent of the religious arguments these claims about love and rationality were cited for, this idea of a primacy of love over rationality is an interesting one.* The argument made for the primacy of love is a compelling and heartfelt human one. The fact that love has been studied extensively in the disciplines of philosophy, sociology, psychology, neuroscience, etc. without any comprehensive or unifying theory can be seen as evidence that love somehow defies rational understanding. Even evolutionary biologists, who may argue that love is merely a set of chemical reactions in the brain that were bred into us as an evolutionary tool for survival of the species, can not possibly claim to understand the entirety of the emotion. After all, breaking it down into hormonal components--while potentially revealing about certain aspects of love or human nature--can never really encapsulate the entirety of the phenomenon.
Nevertheless, despite how resistant to rationality love may be, the body of work conducted around the phenomenon of love also shows how interested we are in coming to some sort of rational understanding of it. This impulse to provide an explantion grounded in reason of a fundamentally unreasonable feeling (or fundamentally complex feeling such that reason alone is insufficient in comprehending it) seems to be quite natural. While rationality may not be able to provide a definitive and fully comprehensive reason for love, it can certainly help us to better understand it and perhaps have a better awareness of our own love.
Can love, then, really transcend rationality, or have some sort of primacy over it? Or does rationality legitimately have a place in understanding and analyzing the phenomenon of love? Not to be cliché, but it seems like the answer is properly a combination of both. In a way, we can say that love transcends our rationality in that we can never understand our feelings of love when internal to the system, i.e. when we are loving. To put it another way, we don't (rationally, at least) choose who or what we love. But to say that love is completely independent of rationality would also be absurd, although this rationality can likely only serve as an agent of reflection, and no more. Rationality dictating love seems to entirely defeat the purpose and circumvent the definition of love. However, this claim doesn't seem to invalidate the intellectual effort spent on understanding, as Queen would call it, this "crazy little thing called love."
-----
*Cottingham argues for the primacy of praxis, or religious practice as a way of having religious faith without sacrificing rationality. That argument doesn't seem to really apply in the same way to love. We are then, therefore, left with the the primacy of either love or rationality, and unlikely both. [See Ch.1 of The Spiritual Dimension.]
The Internet and Alienation
Is the internet an additional source of Marxist "alienation"?
By "internet," I'm mostly thinking about social networking sites that are all the rage these days--Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin, etc.--but, for the purposes of this post, the "internet" encompasses all socially relevant applications of the world wide web where people can relate to one another and engage in a two-way communication. NYTimes.com, for example, while a wonderful website, would not be considered in this question because its main purpose is the dissemination of information and the internet is used only as a medium of delivery and not a forum where people can come together for some particular purpose. Of course, one could argue that the "comments" and discussions there are a form of social connection, which is true. The point of the example, however, is to illustrate the part of the internet I'm considering in my analysis of the possible alienation that it brings about.
Benefits of social networking on the internet abound. The popular argument for the internet seems to be the way in which it allows people to connect across geographical proximity and gives a greater access to a greater number of people. In that way, the internet allows for a flourishing of particularity, as Hegel might put it. The internet parallels capitalism rather closely, allowing for a degree of anonymity and equality (of even physical qualities, which is unique to this virtual world) while simultaneously providing for a wide swath of individual, particular interests. It's not difficult to see how the internet provides opportunities that would not be possible without it.
On the other hand, Marx's theory of alienation seems to apply quite appropriately to this relatively new form of social activity. In a way, the internet acts as an "intermediary" between humans, separating humans from direct contact with each other, much in the way that God acts as an intermediary in Bruno Bauer's argument on the Jewish question. Does the internet, then, take away from our lives as "species-beings," or our human essence? Does it alienate us from one another the same way capitalism brings about alienation of labor?
As we become more reliant on cyber-social relationships and spend more time in front of the screen, shouldn't we be wary of the consequences of this new system? Not that we can stop the internet from developing or from people taking advantage of new developments, but how can we conceive of it in such a way so that it doesn't fall into all of the same traps that capitalism has? How can we balance our cyber and physical lives, so that we can enjoy the benefits of the internet without suffering from the possible alienation?
By "internet," I'm mostly thinking about social networking sites that are all the rage these days--Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin, etc.--but, for the purposes of this post, the "internet" encompasses all socially relevant applications of the world wide web where people can relate to one another and engage in a two-way communication. NYTimes.com, for example, while a wonderful website, would not be considered in this question because its main purpose is the dissemination of information and the internet is used only as a medium of delivery and not a forum where people can come together for some particular purpose. Of course, one could argue that the "comments" and discussions there are a form of social connection, which is true. The point of the example, however, is to illustrate the part of the internet I'm considering in my analysis of the possible alienation that it brings about.
Benefits of social networking on the internet abound. The popular argument for the internet seems to be the way in which it allows people to connect across geographical proximity and gives a greater access to a greater number of people. In that way, the internet allows for a flourishing of particularity, as Hegel might put it. The internet parallels capitalism rather closely, allowing for a degree of anonymity and equality (of even physical qualities, which is unique to this virtual world) while simultaneously providing for a wide swath of individual, particular interests. It's not difficult to see how the internet provides opportunities that would not be possible without it.
On the other hand, Marx's theory of alienation seems to apply quite appropriately to this relatively new form of social activity. In a way, the internet acts as an "intermediary" between humans, separating humans from direct contact with each other, much in the way that God acts as an intermediary in Bruno Bauer's argument on the Jewish question. Does the internet, then, take away from our lives as "species-beings," or our human essence? Does it alienate us from one another the same way capitalism brings about alienation of labor?
As we become more reliant on cyber-social relationships and spend more time in front of the screen, shouldn't we be wary of the consequences of this new system? Not that we can stop the internet from developing or from people taking advantage of new developments, but how can we conceive of it in such a way so that it doesn't fall into all of the same traps that capitalism has? How can we balance our cyber and physical lives, so that we can enjoy the benefits of the internet without suffering from the possible alienation?
Thursday, March 18, 2010
Number One
Truth is, I've started many blogs in my life. None seem to have lasted, partly because I'm bad at commitment and partly because my obsessive standards for publishing on the scarily exposed world wide web have served as a hindrance in my being heard at all. Alas, those days are over! Following this post will hopefully be a (beautifully chaotic, maybe?) jumble of thoughts and ramblings on matters of philosophical significance.
So, why "philosophizings"? The definition the Merriam-Webster gives for "philosophize" is as follows:
1. to reason in the manner of a philosopher
2. to expound a moralizing and often superficial philosophy
I figured my credentials don't yet allow me to call what I'm doing true philosophy, although I promise I will try. Though my pretentious style of writing may contradict my aim, it is one of (humorous, perhaps?) humility. Furthermore, in being self-conscious of the derision directed at my constant ramblings, I thought I would deflect such criticisms by immediately acknowledging the fact that what am about to say can easily be construed as the expounding of essentially bullshit.
Yeah, yeah, yeah life's so easy in the ivory tower, you say. But hey, someone has to step off the hamster wheel from time to time to realize, "Shit, we're going in circles!"
So I say, philosophize on!
So, why "philosophizings"? The definition the Merriam-Webster gives for "philosophize" is as follows:
1. to reason in the manner of a philosopher
2. to expound a moralizing and often superficial philosophy
I figured my credentials don't yet allow me to call what I'm doing true philosophy, although I promise I will try. Though my pretentious style of writing may contradict my aim, it is one of (humorous, perhaps?) humility. Furthermore, in being self-conscious of the derision directed at my constant ramblings, I thought I would deflect such criticisms by immediately acknowledging the fact that what am about to say can easily be construed as the expounding of essentially bullshit.
Yeah, yeah, yeah life's so easy in the ivory tower, you say. But hey, someone has to step off the hamster wheel from time to time to realize, "Shit, we're going in circles!"
So I say, philosophize on!
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