Consumption of caffeine is almost ubiquitous in American society (particularly in New York, the city that never sleeps). It is a behavior and cultural phenomenon that is hardly ever put into serious question. But what can we say about its performance-enhancing aspects? Is a lawyer's or student's cup-a-day coffee habit different than a baseball player's creatine regimen? This morning, I had an interesting conversation with a friend regarding caffeine consumption and his choice to not consume caffeine. Although I was far from being convinced from abandoning my occasional use of caffeine (frequent use during finals week), the argumentative structure he used was interestingly foreign to me, and our conversation seemed to almost represent the east-west paradigmatic difference in philosophy.
This friend of mine claimed that use of caffeine was bad, and explained his choice to avoid caffeine with the following two supporting arguments:
Argument 1
P1 = Caffeine is a performance-enhancing substance.
P2 = It is morally wrong to consume any performance-enhancing substance.
C = Caffeine consumption is morally wrong.
Argument 2
P1 = Caffeine consumption causes positive effects such as increased alertness, etc.
P2 = Caffeine consumption causes various side effects such as the jitters, fast heartbeat, etc.
P3 = The negative side effects of caffeine consumption outweigh the positive effects.
C = Caffeine consumption is impractical.
We have, then, a two-sided argument for why the consumption of caffeine is bad. We can summarize the overall argument, then, as follows:
Overall Argument
P1 = Caffeine consumption is morally wrong.
P2 = Caffeine consumption is impractical.
C = Since caffeine consumption is both morally wrong and impractical, it is bad and we ought not to do it.
Disregarding the soundness of the argument for argument's sake, it seems quite apparent that the argument is valid. If something is both morally wrong and impractical, must it not then be bad in all senses of the term? What seems to be problematic with this position is that the two premises assume two fundamentally competing world views, i.e. deontological ethics and consequentialism. Thus, while the argument is valid for the issue at hand, it assumes two inconsistent world views. If one is to judge the goodness of an action based on its adherence to moralized rules such as "It is wrong to consume any performance-enhancing substance," how can one also judge the goodness of an action based on its consequences such as health benefits?
In this case, both the deontological and consequentialist view produce the same result that caffeine consumption is bad, but it is not difficult to come up with a case where the produce starkly contrasting results. [See end for such an example.] Thus, if one is to maintain a consistent and systematic approach to ethics, the two views can not be maintained simultaneously across all issues. This division of deontology and consequentialism is a characteristically western canonical distinction, and my friend raised a very good question in response to my counter-argument:
Why can't I hold these two views simultaneously? Do my two arguments not compliment each other in helping me to formulate my decision on this particular issue of caffeine consumption?
The answer is perhaps not so clear. And perhaps it is worth thinking about whether, as logical and rational beings, we ought to enforce this idea of consistency in world view. Although it serves to simplify matters and the appeal to consistency is certainly compelling, perhaps it is also important to consider the possibility of being more flexible on systematic views in order to allow a more complete and holistic approach to individual issues...
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The following is a case where the deontological and consequentialist view produce contrasting results. Suppose I donate $50 to a non-profit masquerading as a world hunger advocacy group that is actually an under-cover terrorist organization. The deontologist would condone my actions on the basis that I acted upon my duty to aid the world's poor. The consequentialist, however, would find my actions to be deeply problematic in that I just contributed to $50 worth of supplies for a suicide bomber.
